Tax Amnesty Policy Discourse in Perspective of Politic of Taxation by Rosdiana, H & Putranti, T M
International Conference on Social and Political Issues (ICSPI 2016)
International Conference on Social and Political Issues (the 1st ICSPI, 2016)
“Knowledge and Social Transformation”
Volume 2018
Conference Paper
Tax Amnesty Policy Discourse in Perspective
of Politic of Taxation
Haula Rosdiana1 and Titi M. Putranti2
1Faculty of Administrative Science, Universitas Indonesia
2Faculty of Administrative Science / Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas
Indonesia
Abstract
Pro and cons have been raised of the tax amnesty policy initiated by the government.
Even the policy proposals have been viewed as potentials to increase distrust between
the government and the people. Aside from hurting sense of justice, the absence of
roadmap and the lack of defined prerequisites of successful tax amnesty have raised
suspicions of hidden agenda behind the tax amnesty initiatives.
The objective of this research is to analyze the policy formulation in the process
of the legalization of tax amnesty occurring in 2015 until May, 2016 based on data
from literature, documentation, as well as observation studies. The results show
that the discourses on tax amnesty have occurred because of lack of government’s
transparency in showing the urgency and significance of the tax amnesty, as well as
cost and benefits for the people of Indonesia. This is indicated by the absence of a
roadmap that can convince people that the tax amnesty is a necessity in the political
situation at this time, and will benefit the entire people of Indonesia in both the short
term and the long term.
The political environment in the discussions on the Tax Amnesty draft indicates the
two-polar opinions to the draft correlate to the political factions voicing the opinions.
The dynamics of the discussion in the Parliament aswell as changes in the Tax Amnesty
draft from original proposal from the government show political dynamic processes
and some pressure groups that are involved in it.
This research recommends the strengthening of political communications of taxation
in order to create transparency and accountability so that distrust between states and
people can be minimized. In addition, the government should change its paradigm
of taxation by changing the view of taxation as not only as state budget collection
machine, but also as an instrument of democratization.
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1. Introduction
Tax amnesty obviously represents willingness of a state to remove its authority in
collecting revenue according to the mandate of taxation law. According to the Act
No.11/ 2016 about Tax Amnesty (henceforth called TA Act), the state gives previllage
toward taxpayers whose business circulation worth up to Rp 4.800.000.000 (four bil-
lion and eight hundred million rupiahs) at a very low rate redeem money, 0,5% (zero
comma five percent) for those who reveals wealth value up to Rp10.000.000.000,00
(ten billion rupiahs) in a written Statement. Moreover, the special tax rate is valid
until the end of Tax Amnesty period - unlike tax rate for other taxpayer which is
lower only for the first three months of Tax Amnesty period. However, in reality, the
implementation of Tax Amnesty Bill passed on July 1, 2016 leads to negative responds.
Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency (Fitra) pleads the Directorate General of
Taxes in case of Tax Amnesty policy (henceforth shortened to TA) to the Ombudsman
of Republic of Indonesia (ORI) on Tuesday September 6, 2016. Secretary General of
Fitra’s National Secretariat Yenny Sucipto considers Tax Amnesty policy to harm small
to medium business. Tax officers’ inability to properly explain Tax Amnesty policy had
caused fear among small to medium businessman (Kompas Daily Newspaper).
At first, One Justice Foundation (YSK), along with the Indonesian People Resis-
tance Union (SPRI) filed judicial review to the Constitutional Court (MK) on July 13,
2016. (Retrieved from http://finance.detik.com/read/2016/07/13/115534/3252331/
4/dinilailegalkan-praktik-pencucian-uang-uu-tax-amnesty-dibawa-ke-mk) It is fol-
lowed by Committee of Justice and Human Rights of Muhammadiyah Central Leader,
which at the end of August 2016 also file judicial review on TA Act. (Retrieved
from http://www.republika.co.id/berita/ekonomi/makro/16/08/28/ocltzw382-
muhammadiyah-ajukan-judicial-review-uu-pengampunan-pajak) Resistance and
commotion caused by the implementation of TA of course is interesting to be exam-
ined. By analyze roots of the problem, can the government immediately conduct
evaluation on TA Act as a lesson for the upcoming formulation of tax policy.
Many parties believe that the government has set tax revenue target too high
on 2015, by implementing TA to resolve budget deficit. The government was con-
sidered too ambitious by setting tax revenue target of Rp 1.294,3 trillion or around
20,7% more than the previous year acceptance. While for the last five years, tax
revenues never meet the target. Even in 2014 the revenue recorded shortfall of Rp90
trillion, below Rp1.072 trillion targeted in 2014 Revised State Budget. (Retrieved from
http://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20151019235544-78-85922/penerimaan-
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pajakloyo-terjebak-target-tinggi-jokowi/) Amid economic declining, high tax revenue
target only widens the budget deficit as shown in Table 1 below.
T 1: State Budget (in Billion Rupiah), 2007-2015. Source: Ministry of Finance
Source: Ministry of Finance
Data 2014 and 2015 quoted from Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 2015.
Retrived from https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1178
Although tax revenue target in 2015 did not achieved and the budget deficit
widened, the government ambitions to carry out some national projects – especially
in the field of infrastructure – has caused the tax revenue target to be raised up to Rp
1.546,7 trillion in 2016, as it can be seen in the Table 2 below:
Based on the above condition, the research problem of this study is on ”How Tax
Amnesty discourse be reviewed from the politic of taxation perspective?” The subject
of this study is elaborated into three research questions as follows:
1. How can we understand tax amnesty in the context of politic of taxation?
2. Why did resistance occur in the implementation of Tax Amnesty Act?
3. What are the factors that cause negative perception on Tax Amnesty?
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T 2: Draft State Budget (RAPBN) and State Budget (APBN) (in Billion Rupiah), 2016.
Source: 2016 State budget. Retrieved from http://www.kemenkeu.go.id/en/node/47651
2. Research Method
This research is conducted by implementing literature, documentation and observation
studies on the process of Tax Amnesty legalization occurring from 2015 until May 2016,
as well as by assessing the implementation of TA Act since July 1, 2016.
3. Result and Discussion
3.1. Tax amnesty in the context of politic of taxation
In the context of politic of taxation, tax amnesty essentially requires state willingness
to remove its authority to levy tax according to the mandate of taxation law. State also
foregoes its right to force taxpayers by provide opportunity and offer fiscal compro-
mise to them.
Tax in the classical paradigm is narrowly defined as mandatory fee collected accord-
ing to the law. Tax in return is to be used to finance public purposes without directly
provide feedback to the taxpayers. According to Article 1 Number 1 Act No.28 Third
Amendment of Act No. 6/ 1983 about the General Rules and Procedures for Taxation
(henceforth referred as KUP Act/ 2007), ”Tax is compulsory contribution to the state
which owed by personal or private corporation,... (it) is compulsory levy based on
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the Act, which does not give direct reward to the taxpayers and is used for the pur-
pose of state and the great prosperity of the people.” (Republic of Indonesia, Article
No.28 Third Amendment of Act No.6/ 1983 about 1983 about the General Rules and
Procedures for Taxation, Additional State Paper Republic of Indonesia No.4740) This
formulation is dominantly influenced by classical paradigm that put emphasize on the
elements of tax as: a) mandatory fee, b) can be imposed, c) collected based on the
laws, d) taxpayers do not get direct contra-achievement, and e) used to finance public
purposes.
Elements of tax can be seen from the opinion of Handcock as quoted by Rosdiana
and Irianto. Based on classical paradigm, Handcock mentioned that general charac-
teristics of tax are: a) compulsory contributions, b) imposed by the government c)
for which taxpayers do not get specific reward, and d) its main objective is to collect
governmental income to finance public expenditure.
All taxes have some features in common. They are compulsory levy, imposed by
government, either on income, expenditure or capital assets, for which the tax-
payer receives nothing specific in return. The primary purpose of imposing a tax
is to raise revenue for public purposes. (Haula Rosdiana and Edi Slamet Irianto.
Pengantar Perpajakan: Teori dan Implementasinya di Indonesia. Rajagrafindo,
2013, pp. 1-2)
Prominent tax and financial experts generally implement classic paradigm in for-
mulating tax definition. James, for example, defined tax as “a compulsory levy made
by public authorities for whom nothing is received directly in return.” (Simon James
and Christopher Nobes. The Economic of Taxation: Principles, Policy and Practice,
1996/1997 Edition, Europe: Prentice Hall, 1996, page 10.) While Sommerfeld, Anderson
and Brock defines taxes as “……… any non-penal yet compulsory transfer of resources
from the private to the public sector, levied on the basis of predetermined criteria and
without receipt of a specific benefit of equal value, in order to accomplish some of a
nation’s economic and social objectives.” (Ray M. Sommerfeld, Hershel M. Anderson
and Horace R. Brock. An Introduction to Taxation. New York: Harcourt Brace Jonovich
Inc., 1981, page 1/1)
Although they did not provide specific definition on tax, Musgrave and Musgrave
mention that, (Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave. Public Finance in Theory
and Practice. New York: Mc Graw Hill Company, 1989, page 220) “Taxes and charges
are withdrawn from the private sector without leaving the government with a liability
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to the payee.” Musgrave and Musgrave also mentioned that “Taxes are compulsory
imposts.” This opinion is clearly visible of using classic paradigm.
Indonesian taxation system was historically influenced by the Dutch. A financial
expert whose opinion often referred, Adriani defines tax as ”levy paid to state (that can
be imposed) indebted by obligated payee according to the regulations, which receives
nothing specific in return, directly appointed, and which purpose is to raise revenue
for public expenditures. (R. Santoso Brotodihardjo. Pengantar Ilmu Hukum Pajak. Third
Edition. Bandung: PT Eresco, 1993, p. 2) Adriani’s opinions exist in almost tax literature.
Based on several definitions of tax according to classical paradigm, it can be con-
cluded that one element which is important and fundamental in tax is ”imposed”
characteristics, because tax has execution strength. In the tax implementation, Indone-
sian government manifested the imposing element through Act of Tax Billing with
Notification Letter (TASP Act). However, even though tax can be imposed; the sanction
is different with those given to criminal. The punishment is aimed to prevent a person
perform certain action that may damage or interfere the community. Quoting Som-
merfeld, Rosdiana mentioned that taxes are non-penal. (Ibid) The main differences
between tax sanction and criminal penalty are the scale and the underlying purpose
of sanction. “The major differences between a tax and a penalty are (1) the relative
size of exaction demanded, and (2) the specific objective behind the exaction.”
The main purpose of tax sanction is not to imprison people, but to encourage people
carry out his obligations to pay tax. Moreover, if tax sanction is stressed more to
imprison people, then actually state has to spend bigger amount of funds to finance
the investigations, prosecution, and execution of negligent taxpayer. In line with Gor-
don’s opinion that “Financial sanctions may raise revenue, while prison sentences may
increase expenditures. Financial sanctions may even be designed in such a way that
they cover the tax administration’s expenses in pursuing a case, from investigation
through final collection. (Richard K. Gordon, Op. Cit.) Hence, For this reason, in interna-
tional best practice, fiscal compromise becomes prevalence in the taxation system.
In Indonesian tax system, fiscal compromise is set in Article 8 on Paragraph 3 of KUP
Act as quoted below:
Although an audit had been done, but criminal investigation on the existence
of unrighteousness of Taxpayers has not been done yet; as it is referred in
Article 38 on the unrighteousness deed of Taxpayers; investigations will not
be performed if the Taxpayers with his own willingness reveals his fault and
redeem obliged tax deficiency along with the penalty for the administration of
150% (one hundred and fifty percent) the unpaid tax. (Republic of Indonesia,
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Article No.28 Third Amendment of Act No.6/ 1983 about 1983 about the General
Rules and Procedures for Taxation, Additional State Paper Republic of Indonesia
No.4740)
Fiscal compromise is part of the Tax Amnesty (TA). The word ”Amnesty” is derived
from the Greek άμνηστία/amnestia/, which means ”forgetfulness or passing over”.
Andreoni defines TA as ”Tax amnesties are government programs that forgive all or
part of the penalties owed by tax cheaters if they voluntarily repay their delinquent
taxes. ( James Andreoni. The desirability of a permanent tax amnesty, Journal of Pub-
lic Economics 45 (1991) 143-159. North-Holland. Retrieved from http://econweb.ucsd.
edu/$\sim$jandreon/Publications/JPubE1991.pdf) Tax formula to ascertain tax liabili-
ties is basically determined by the tariff and taxable basis imposed. In self-assessment
system, the obligation to a) calculate, b) pay and c) report tax liabilities is arranged in
a formal tax law provisions which govern what, who, when, where, and how aspects,
including sanctions if the formal terms are not fulfilled. Therefore, in general, TA can
be defined as model of amnesty, either in form of a) elimination of tax due, and/or b)
deletion/reduction of tax sanctions that should be imposed based on tax legislation.
Hence, Tax Amnesty can be determined in the form of explicit or implicit, partial or full,
permanent or temporary.
Whatever the shape or political perspectives it came from, TA is essentially a form
of state willingness to remove its authority on collecting tax and/or levy sanction
in accordance to the mandate of taxation law. The authority that state is willingly
accepted is a part of taxation role as a political instrument. There are at least three
main reasons of why a state justifies this policy.
Firstly, according to the perspective of tax as an instrument of democracy, TA can
be defined as an effort to embrace more people and subject to participate in building
the state. Both a) unregistered tax subjects and b) registered tax subjects (Taxpayers
with Identification Number/ NPWP) yet partially fulfills his obligation, are expected to
fully participate in the taxation system.
Secondly, TA can become the momentum to perform national reconciliation. In the
implementation of TA, not only the statemust have volunteered its authority, but it also
takes the taxpayers’ willingness to fulfill his obligations. Therefore, national leaders
must be able to convince the people that the TA is a means of national reconciliation
to improve the economic, social and political system.
Thirdly, TA policy represents a momentum to improve the taxation system that
ensures legal certainty. As what has become prevalence, in addition to provisioning
overdue and billing overdue, retroactive principle term is also known in the taxation
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system. According to retroactive principle, a state has an authority to impose indebted
years of tax before a taxpayer was registered as long as the taxpayer status is legally
proven (tatbestand). Indonesia is an example of nationwhich implements this principle.
3.2. Factors that trigger resistance and negative perception on
tax amnesty
There has been any policy which stirs up controversy in the history of Indonesian
taxation system. Before it was confirmed, TA Act gets positive feedback from aca-
demics, practitioners and parliament members, which have authority to pass the draft
into legislation. Even good reaction among public were increased as soon as TA Act
legalized.
However, on the early September 2016, at least an organization filed judicial review
on the policy, whereas another organization also filed a lawsuit to the Ombudsman as
it can be seen in the following table:
T 3: Efforts to Resist Tax Amnesty Act.
Accusing/
Reporting Party
Accusation Reason Date of Report
Accusing/
Reporting Party










Eleven Articles in Tax Amnesty Act
reported are Article 1 clause (1) and (7);
Article 3 clause (1), (3) and (5); Article 4;
Article 11 clause (2) and (3); Article 19;






1. Tax Amnesty Act allows money
laundering practice legally.
2. Tax Amnesty Act gives priority to
white collar criminals.
3. Tax Amnesty Act becomes “a red
carpet” for negligent taxpayers.
4. Tax Amnesty Act provides magnified
”discount” to negligent taxpayers.
5. Tax Amnesty Act tackles
whistleblower program.
6. Tax Amnesty Act crashes into the
Principle of Information Disclosure.
7. Tax Amnesty Act is potentially used by
taxation criminals.
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Accusing/
Reporting Party
Accusation Reason Date of Report
8. Tax Amnesty Act is deemed
ineffective as the same policy on 1964
and 1986.
9. Tax Amnesty Act removes state
revenue potential.
10. Tax Amnesty Act is a form of betrayal
to the poor.
11. Tax Amnesty Act teaches the people
to not obey tax regulation.
12. Tax Amnesty Act marginalizes
obedience taxpayers.
13. Tax is a compulsory levy.
14. Tax Amnesty Act is strange because
it applies one year only.
15. Tax Amnesty Act put the President
and Parliament into a position which
potentially violates the constitution.
16. Tax Amnesty Act implementation is
not in accorcance with the principle of
equality before law.
17. Tax Amnesty Act is a form of
intervention and destruction of law
enforcement process.
18. Tax Amnesty Act reflects
government’s weakness toward
negligent taxpayers.
19. Tax Amnesty Act paralyzes law
enforcement institutions.
20. Tax Amnesty Act should be
suspected as an instrument of negligent
taxpayer because it provides them
exclusive rights.
21. Tax Amnesty Act halts the ongoing









1. Tax Amnesty policy should have clear
direction according to the Article 1, 28,
and 33 of Constitution 1945 which
contains democracy and human rights
values. However, in fact, the formulation




2. The discussion of Tax Amnesty draft
did not involve the public at large.
Indonesian community should have been
able to learn and evaluate academic draft
of the amnesty. Communities also should
have been given the opportunity to give
suggestion before the bill was passed.
Hence the unilateral arrangement had
betrayed the democratic process.
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Accusing/
Reporting Party
Accusation Reason Date of Report
3. Tax Amnesty Act has raises delirium
among middle to lower society which at
any moment potentially become the
target of beleid implementation. The
government intention to to raise revenue
for public purposes by implementing Tax
Amnesty toward Non-Resident Taxpayer




















1. The basic philosophy in the formation
of Tax Amnesty policy is constitutionally
flawed. For example, the basis argument
of Tax Amnesty Act is misinterpreted
from Article 23 A. It is contrary to the
Constitution Article 23 and 23 A about
State Budget management and tax levy.
Tax Amnesty Act is also contrary to State
Finance Act No. 17/2003.
6-Sep-16
2. Tax Amnesty policy is considered
unfair for small to medium businesses
(UKM). This year tax amnesty is
predicted to have the same fate with TA
1984 due to lack of information access,
openness and socialization.
- Will also file a
judicial review
3. Imaginary target of Rp 165 trillion will
not be achieved and thus will only
increase the burden of 2017 state budget
deficit. Fitra simulation finds that from
Rp 8.000-10,000 trillion overseas funds
owned by Indonesian conglomerate,
only Rp 50 trillion maximum funds will
add into State Budget.
4. This policy will provide “red carpet”
for negligent taxpayers, not the small to
medium busniess because the main
purpose of Tax Amnesty is not to fill in
deficit, but rather to make
conglomerate’s business keep running.
5. This policy is counterproductive to the
anti-corruption spirit. Tax Amnesty was
initially designed to forgive corruptors
and to delegitimate efforts to fight
corruption. Since Tax Amnesty does not
include verification on the origin of
wealth; whether the assetts of taxpayer
is from corruption, illegal logging or
drugs selling.
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Accusing/
Reporting Party
Accusation Reason Date of Report
6. Tax amnesty represents creativity
deadlock of the government in its efforts
to gain alternative state revenue as well
as evidence of unability of the
government to collect receiveable from
State Owned Enterprises. Until 2015, Fitra
noted, state has trade receiveable over
dividend State Owned Enterprises of
Rp656 trillion during 2010-2015, while tax
receivable from State Owned Enterprises




Resistance against TA Act actually could be predicted since the draft was discussed
by the parliament. Conceptual/theoretical gap was discovered in TA formulation. In
addition, gap was also found in the policy implementation. (See table 4). The elabora-
tion of those three gaps is explained as follows:
T 4: Core Problem of TA Act Resistance.
Conceptual/theoretical gap Policy gap Implementation gap
- Conceptually, TA is an issue
debated;






- Previous study has shown
that TA does not always have
positive implications;
- The implementing regulation






- There has been no
international best practice that
can be used as benchmark
because the political system
and condition of each country
vary.
- Trustworthiness
Source: Several sources. Data processed by the researchers.
3.2.1. Conceptual/theoretical gap in the formulation of
tax amnesty policy
The concept of Tax Amnesty is often considered controversial as it is alternatively
used to boost national revenue. Alm and Rath stated that the obvious goal of TA is to
improve short term revenue. This presumptionmay happen. However, post-enactment
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i10.2915 Page 260
International Conference on Social and Political Issues (ICSPI 2016)
of TA generates hope among taxpayers that similar policy may be implemented later
on. This will cause low tax compliance in the future.
Tax amnesties are controversial revenue tool. The obvious purpose of a tax
amnesty is to raise short-run revenue. This may or may not work, and it can
bring about expectations of future amnesties thereby reducing taxpayer com-
pliance after the amnesty (James Alm and David M Rath. Tax Policy Analysis:
The Introduction of a Russian Tax Amnesty. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=471321)
Those who support TA believe that this policy enables the government to collect
potential revenue which is difficult to be billed through the law enforcement.
The argument for instituting tax amnesty program is usually to forgo the tax
revenue that has proven to be difficult to enforce with the objective to secure
a short term increase in tax revenue from that category of taxpayers. (Jonas
Jensen and Florian Wöhlbier. Improving Tax Governance in EU Member States:
Criteria for Successful Policies. Occasional Papers 114 | August 2012, European
Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Publications,
ISSN 1725-3209)
This has become one of the reasons why TA remains a popular instrument to boost
financial revenue and improve tax compliance.
Tax amnesties remain popular as an instrument aimed at raising revenue
and increasing tax compliance. The common inducement offered in exchange
for voluntary disclosure of past untaxed income is a significant but tempo-
rary reduction in tax liabilities including penalties. (Jonas Jensen and Florian
Wöhlbier. Improving Tax Governance in EU Member States: Criteria for Suc-
cessful policies, Occasional Papers 114 | August 2012, European Commission
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Publications, ISSN 1725-
3209)
In line with Jensen and Wöhlbier, Beck II also suggests that TA is now a popular tool
to increase income level quickly.
In recent years’ state governments have pursued a variety of methods to
generate immediate revenues and keep income levels growing. One approach
that has become increasingly popular is the tax amnesty. (William Clifton Beck,
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II. The Economics of Tax Amnesties: A Theoretical, Empirical, and Experimen-
tal Analysis, University of Colorado at Boulder, ProQuest Dissertations Pub-
lishing, 1991. 9132544. Retrived from http://search.proquest.com/docview/
303940481/ fulltextPDF/362C9E8781942F0PQ/3?accountid=17242)
T 5: Pro and Contra of TA Policy.
PRO CONTRA
1. To ease financial burden of the community
due to tax defy and sanction caused by
confusion in the past;
1. Trigger economic inequity;
2. To create tax justice due to the increasing
number of tax payer;
2. Cause jealousy among taxpayers;
3. To improve tax compliance as a result of
public confidence;
3. Cause legal jealousy especially from the
other rule of law;
4. As a momentum to improve tax
administration.
4. Trigger distrust toward the government if no
changes happen to taxation orientation after
the implementation of TA.
Source: Several sources. Data processed by the researchers.
Meanwhile, those who oppose TA sense that the policy may arouse jealousy among
taxpayers, which in long term can disrupt tax morale. In the study of Luitel and Sobel,
as quoted by Jensen and Wöhlbier, TA policy in many countries was not encouraging.
Contrary to what has planned, TA policy cause lower level of tax compliance after the
amnesty.
The experience of tax amnesty programmes at country level is not encourag-
ing. Several studies have provided evidence that additional tax amnesties are
likely to produce decreasing yields and discourage future compliance (see Luitel
and Sobel, 2007). (Jonas Jensen and Florian Wöhlbier. Improving Tax Gover-
nance in EU Member States: Criteria for Successful Policies, Occasional Papers
114 | August 2012, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and
Financial Affairs Publications, ISSN 1725-3209)
Alm, as quoted by Jensen and Wöhlbier, concluded that TA policy provide only little
additional tax revenues and slightly affected taxpayers’ willingness on post-amnesty
compliance.
Such programmes have, e.g., been implemented in Italy, Greece and Germany.
Most evidence suggests that tax amnesties generate little additional tax rev-
enues and also seem to have relatively little effects on post-amnesty compli-
ance [2]. (Jonas Jensen and Florian Wöhlbier, Improving Tax Governance in EU
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Member States: Criteria for Successful Policies, Occasional Papers 114 | August
2012, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs Publications, ISSN 1725-3209)
Furthermore, Jensen and Wöhlbier concluded that positive effects on post-amnesty
enactment tend to be overestimated.
Furthermore, the positive effects of past tax amnesties are likely to have been
overestimated. Figures for received amounts in a tax amnesty programme
would invariably include amounts that might otherwise have been collected in
the normal course of tax enforcement. Moreover, the long term effects of dete-
riorating the tax morale are never included. (Jonas Jensen and Florian Wöhlbier,
Improving Tax Governance in EU Member States: Criteria for Successful Policies,
Occasional Papers 114 | August 2012, European Commission Directorate-General
for Economic and Financial Affairs Publications, ISSN 1725-3209)
Conceptually, TA itself does not have standard and rigid definition to be used as
international best practice. This can be understood since tax strategic environment
varies in every country. Therefore, based on politic of taxation perspective, TA policy
may have positive and negative side effects as seen in Table 6.
T 6: Positive and Negatives Sides of TA Policy.
Positive Side of TA Negative Side of TA
1. Tax Amnesty requires state willingness to
remove its authority in collecting tax along
with the mandate of taxation law;
1. Tax Amnesty may trigger taxpayers to
neglect their duty if the tax authority unable to
expand taxation basis;
2. Tax Amnesty can be narrowly defined as the
momentum to improve tax relations between
the state and the people as a basic principles
of statehood;
2. Tax Amnesty has widened economic
imbalance due to fiscal incentives and tax
liberation given to large scale entrepeneur.
3. Tax Amnesty can be an effective instrument
in building foundation of taxation trust.
Source: Several sources. Data processed by the researchers.
3.2.2. Policy gap in the formulation of tax amnesty policy
It is likely to say that TA Act correlate with budget and tax revenue deficit in 2015. Tax
revenue in 2015 fiscal year hit the lowest percentage since 1990 as it can be seen in
the picture below:
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Picture 1: Factors that Lead to 2015 Achievement Target Not Achieved. (Source: http://katadata.co.id/
berita/2015/12/28/rekor-baru-penerimaan-pajak-tembus-rp-1000-triliun.)
Therefore, it is natural that some parties criticized the implementation of TA Act as
forced and completely unprepared. Even the crucial TA Act was not enclosed with gov-
ernment readiness to publish regulations (See Table 8) as it is often in the procedures
of legislation and other tax law such as KUP Act, TAh Act and TAN Act.
Refer to the process of provisioning a policy agenda modeled by Kingdom (See
picture 3), policy gap can be seen in the formulation of Agenda Setting without full
support from the people, parliament, and related government body.
3.2.3. Implementation gap in the formulation of tax amnesty policy
As a result of unprepared implementation, various problems arose in the field. Even in
the social media hashtag #StopBayarPajak (#StopPayingTax) had become viral.
The trending hashtag in general assume that Tax Amnesty policy inflict a financial
lost too small to medium business. (Retrieved from https://m.tempo.co/read/news/
2016/08/29/087799780/stopbayar-pajak-jadi-viral-pramono-tax-amnestytetap-
jalan) After getting negative reactions from various communities, then the govern-
ment issued Regulation of the Directorate General of Taxes No. PER-11/PJ/2016 about
Further Setting on the Implement action of Act No. 11/2016 about Tax Amnesty on
August 29, 2016. Even though the regulation is considered sufficient, since the first
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Picture 2: Tax Achievement for the Last 25 Years. (Source: http://katadata.co.id/berita/2016/01/04/
palingrendah-realisasi-pajak-2015-cuma-815-persen.)
period of TA will expire at the end of September 2016, some communities demand
the government to issue a Government Regulation to Replace Law Number (Perpu)
for the first quarter period of TA to be extended until November 2016. (See: “Tunggu




Negative publicity over the TA implementation has caused the realization of accep-
tance to be very far from target set by the government, of 165 trillion rupiah (See
Picture 4). At the previous discussion on TA Draft, Indonesian government estimated
the additional state revenue of 165 trillion rupiah if the amnesty is implemented. Even
the prediction had been inserted in National Budget Changes (RAPBN) 2016. In addi-
tion, the government also targeted repatriation funds of 1,000 trillion rupiah. (See http:
//www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20160523174352-78-132895/menkeumasukkan-
penerimaan-tax-amnesty-rp165-t-dalam-apbnp/)
Based on a Press Release published by the Directorate of Information, Counseling
and Public Relations at the Directorate General of Taxes, Ministry of Finance Republic
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T 7: Rules in Tax Amnesty Implementation.
Ministry of Finance Decree Ministry of Finance Decision Directorate of Taxes Regulation
No. 118/Ministry of Finance
(MoF) Decree.03/2016 about
the Implementation of Act No.




Perception Bank Acting as the
Recipient of Ransom Money in
the Context of Tax Amnesty
(1.28 MB)
No. PER-44/PJ/2015 about
Fourth Amendment over the
Regulation of the Director
General of Taxes
No.PER/38/PJ/2009 about the
Form of Tax Deposit Payment
Slip
No. 119/ MoF Decree.08/2016
about Procedures of Wealth
Redirection of the Taxpayers
into the Teritory of Unitary
State of Republic of Indonesia
and the Placement on
Investment Instrumental in the




Announcement of the Head
Office and Regional Offices of
the Directorate General of
Taxes as Specific Place to
Deliver the Asset Statement
Letter in the Context of Tax
Amnesty (540,34 KB)
No. PER-06/PJ/2016 about Fifth
Amendment over the
Regulation of the Director
General of Taxes
No.PER/38/PJ/2009 about the
Form of Tax Deposit Payment
Slip ( July 15, 2016)
No. 122/ MoF Decree.08/2016
about Procedures of Wealth
Redirection of the Taxpayers
into Unitary State of Republic of
Indonesia and the Placement
on the Investment outside




Guidelines in Filling Document
in the Context of Tax Amnesty
( July 18, 2016)
No. 123/ MoF Decree.08/2016
about Changes in the
Regulation of the Minister of
Finance No. 119/ MoF
Decree.08/2016 about
Procedures of Wealth
Redirection of the Taxpayers
into the Teritory of Unitary
State of Republic of Indonesia
and the Placement on
Investment Instrumental in the
Financial Market in the Context
of Tax Amnesty
No. PER-10/PJ/2016 about
Changes in Regulation of the
Director General of Taxes No.
PER-07/PJ/2016 about
Document and Technical
Guidelines in Filling Document
in the Context of Tax Amnesty
(August 19, 2016)
No. 127/ MoF Decree.010/2016
about Tax Amnesty Based on
Act No. 11/ 2016 about Tax




Further Setting on the
Implementation of Act No. 11/
2016 about Tax Amnesty
(August 29, 2016)
of Indonesia, it was announced that up to 6 September 2016 Acquisition Cost that has
been entered into the state treasury is 4,78 trillion rupiah (See Table 8).
The performance on the implementation of TA, which is still very far from target,
can be analyzed by a model that Meter and Horn proposed (Picture 5). As it has been
described previously, standards and objectives of the TA policy in detail have not been
clear and firm, so that the implementation is different fromone Taxation Service Offices
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Picture 3: The Agenda-Setting Process: A Model. (Source: John W. Kingdom. 1984. Agenda Alternatives
and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown.)
Picture 4: Tax Amnesty Statistics. (Source: http://www.lembagapajak.com/2016/09/realisasi-
uangtebusan-tax-amnesty.html.)
and another. Even on the early stage of implementation, many subordinate staffs’ in
the Directorate General of Taxation could not well explain the amnesty.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i10.2915 Page 267
International Conference on Social and Political Issues (ICSPI 2016)
T 8: Tax Amnesty Program Development (until September 6, 2016).
 
Picture 5: A Model of the Policy Implementation Process. (Source: Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn.
1975 “The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework. Administration and Society 6. Sage
Publication. p. 163)
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4. Closing
This study shows that the discourse of Tax Amnesty occurs because the government
were lacking in showing transparency on the significance of Tax Amnesty aswell as the
benefit for Indonesian people. There is no general roadmap that convince people the
importance of Tax Amnesty toward present political situation, and that Tax Amnesty
will benefit Indonesian people in general both in short and long term.
5. Conclusion
This research concludes that:
Firstly, the significant of Tax Amnesty from the perspective of political taxation are:
a. Tax Amnesty is a state political decision which will get positive response from its
community widely, only if the nation is able to convince its community that the
amnesty will provide common good for both state and people.
b. Tax Amnesty is an offer from the state to its people on taxation. Hence, Tax
Amnesty must bring benefit to the state and its people.
c. Tax Amnesty can be used as an indicator of citizen’s nationalism. Therefore, Tax
Amnesty policy is considered successful when it brings repatriated assets back
onshore from non-resident taxpayers as expected by the government.
Secondly, in refer to the conceptual/theoretical gap, resistance toward TA occurs
because a) conceptually, TA is a controversial instrument in increasing state revenue,
b) previous study had proven that TA has negative implications, and c) there have been
no international best practice that can be used as benchmark because the political
system and condition of each country vary.
Policy gap occurs because a) there is no clear roadmap that convinces people, and
b) implementing regulation has not met the ease of administration basis (certainty,
efficiency, simplicity and convenience). Finally, from the perspective of implementa-
tion gap, TA policy is considered fail mainly because of unappropriated administrative
capacity, ineffective political communication and no trustworthiness in the coordina-
tion of taxation on various levels.
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6. Recommendation
To minimize distrust between state and people, as well as to create thorough trans-
parency and accountability, the author urges the need to strengthen communication on
political taxation. The government must also change tax paradigm not only as budget
collector machine, but also as an instrument of democratization. Recommendations of
this research are:
a. The government should change its communication strategy in politic of taxation.
Thus people will believe that Tax Amnesty is the right momentum to improve
lives of nationhood and statehood for the sake of social welfare.
b. The government should make a serious effort to improve tax administration after
the enactment of TA, so that people will feel the impact of lighter tax burden as
the result of bigger tax value basis.
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